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ONE PERSON, NO VOTE? HOW STATE COURTS
AFTER BUSH V. GORE ENSURE UNIFORM
INTERPRETATION OF VOTER INTENT
STATUTES WITHOUT “UNNECESSARY”
VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT
David Odegard*
INTRODUCTION
On May 16, 2008, the New Mexico Attorney General’s office replied
to a request from Secretary of State Mary Herrera asking whether a por-
tion of New Mexico’s voter intent statute was inconsistent with the Help
America Vote Act (HAVA).1 The Assistant Attorney General answered
in the affirmative and further declared that the New Mexico statute
would be vulnerable to an equal protection challenge because of its fail-
ure to ensure uniform application of New Mexico’s statute.2 The specific
portion of the New Mexico statute at issue allows a vote to be counted
when the “judges for the precinct unanimously agree that the voter’s in-
tent is clearly discernable.”3 The response from the Attorney General
found the section at hand to be “virtually indistinguishable from the Flor-
ida standard at issue in Bush v. Gore4 and raises the same [equal protec-
tion] concerns.”5 The New Mexico Supreme Court heard the case on an
emergency writ of mandamus.6 In its opinion, the New Mexico Supreme
Court applied HAVA and rejected the contention that the New Mexico
* University of New Mexico School of Law, Class of 2012. I want to thank
Professor Ruth Kovnat for her patience and guidance as my faculty advisor for this
article. Additionally, I want to thank Professor Lonna Rae Atkeson for introducing
me to the world of election administration and for her support throughout my time in
college and law school.
1. Letter from the Office of the Att’y General, State of N.M., to Mary Herrera,
Sec’y of State and Jeff Steinborn, N.M. State Representative, 2008 WL 2204552, at *1
(May 16, 2008) [hereinafter Att’y General Letter].
2. Id. at *2.
3. NMSA 1978, § 1-1-5.2 (2010).
4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
5. Att’y General Letter supra note 2, at *2. R
6. See State ex rel. League of Women Voters v. Herrera, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶¶
11–12, 203 P.3d 94, 97.
571
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law was invalid because it lacked the uniformity required by Bush v.
Gore.7
Voter intent statutes are adopted in order to assist local govern-
ments and election administrators in uniformly construing each voter’s
intent while disenfranchising as few voters as possible.8 In New Mexico,
election administrators use an optical-scan ballot, where the voter either
fills in an oval with a pencil or a machine fills in the oval.9 The mark is
then read by a machine, which tabulates the votes for each candidate.10
The tabulator machine, however, is made so as only to read those specific
marks inside specific areas and will reject ballots without those marks,
whether or not a voter’s intent is clearly discernable.11 Courts have recog-
nized that voter intent can be determined whether or not a vote is made
in the specific fashion required by a vote tabulator.12 States have there-
fore chosen various paths to balance the goal of having uniform ballots
while at the same time minimizing voter disenfranchisement when the
intent of the voter is clear.13
Part I of this comment examines how New Mexico has balanced uni-
formity and disenfranchisement in light of State ex rel. League of Women
Voters v. Herrera, while Parts II and III compare New Mexico’s method
for discerning voter intent to other states’ methods. Part I.A reviews the
requirements of uniformity from both HAVA and Bush v. Gore, which
guided the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in League of Women
Voters.14 In this case, the defendant, Secretary of State Mary Herrera,
relied on a letter from the Attorney General that argued part of New
Mexico’s voter intent statute was unconstitutional, in light of federal law,
because it did not create the requisite uniformity.15 Part I.B, in turn, ex-
amines how the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision interprets Bush v.
Gore as requiring a different balance of uniformity and voter disen-
7. See id. ¶ 15, 203 P.3d at 97.
8. See infra Part I.B.1.
9. See Lonna Rae Atkeson, R. Michael Alvarez & Thad E. Hall, Assessing Elec-
toral Performance in New Mexico Using an Ecosystem Approach, at ii, available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/report_detail.aspx?id=58623; NMSA 1978, § 1-
9-7.1 (2010).
10. See NMSA 1978, § 1-9-7.1
11. NMSA 1978, § 1-1-5.2(A) (2010).
12. See, e.g., In re Primary Election Ballot Disputes 2004, 2004 ME 99, ¶¶ 22–24,
857 A.2d 494, 501–502.
13. See League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 28, 203 P.3d at 100–101 (list-
ing states with different and similar statutes voter-intent statute).
14. Id. ¶ 2, 203 P.3d at 95.
15. Id. ¶ 5, 203 P.3d at 96.
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franchisement than the Secretary of State and Attorney General.16 This
Part will then look at how the New Mexico Supreme Court supports that
balance by looking at the language of HAVA along with what the New
Mexico Supreme Court considers to be similar state statutes.17
Reliance on those “similar” state statutes, however, is misplaced, ei-
ther because of the differences in the construction of the other state stat-
utes, or because of the differences in the interpretations of those state
statutes. Therefore, Part II examines more closely state statutes that the
New Mexico Supreme Court cites in League of Women Voters, as well as
other state statutes that have been analyzed in state caselaw and are help-
ful in discerning the differences between New Mexico’s statute and the
statutes that the New Mexico Supreme Court cites.18 Part II.A reviews
three state statutes (Missouri, Alaska, and Iowa) that are constructed dif-
ferently than the New Mexico statute, while Part II.B focuses on a cited
Montana statute that has been interpreted to require a different balance
of uniformity than New Mexico’s statute.
Even though the statutes from other states cited in League of Wo-
men Voters are not necessarily supportive of the type of balance between
uniformity and voter disenfranchisement adopted by the New Mexico Su-
preme Court, there is still support for the validity of New Mexico’s stat-
ute. Part III examines three other state statutes, Maine, Wisconsin, and
New York, which are varied in their balancing of uniformity and disen-
franchisement to show that although the New Mexico Supreme Court re-
lied on incorrect statutes, the New Mexico statute’s balance between
uniformity and the risk of voter disenfranchisement is well within the va-
ried application of state statutes nationally. Based upon this examination,
this article concludes that the New Mexico statute would survive a chal-
lenge based on HAVA or the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v.
Gore.
I. STATE EX REL. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS V. HERRERA
New Mexico’s voter intent statute has four subsections that describe
when hand-tallied paper ballots are to be counted:
(B) For paper ballots that are hand-tallied, a vote shall be counted
if:
(1) the ballot is marked in accordance with the instructions
for that ballot type;
16. See infra at 80. R
17. See infra at 80. R
18. League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 28, 203 P.3d at 100.
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(2) the preferred candidate’s name or answer to a ballot
question is circled;
(3) there is a cross or check within the voting response area
for the preferred candidate or answer to the ballot question;
or
(4) the presiding judge and election judges for the precinct
unanimously agree that the voter’s intent is clearly
discernable.19
The Secretary of State, in her letter to the Attorney General, was
concerned with the last provision, subsection (B)(4).20 So on September
30, 2008, the New Mexico Secretary of State promulgated an amendment
to 1.10.12.15(c) of the New Mexico Administrative Code requiring that
an unclearly marked ballot be counted only if the voter has placed a cross
or a check within the voting response area.21 The wording in the code’s
amendment was similar to most of the voter intent statute, except it that
essentially requires county clerks and election administrators to ignore
the catchall provision, subsection (B)(4).22 Secretary Herrera believed
that enforcing subsection (B)(4) was inconsistent with federal require-
ments and would make an election vulnerable to a challenge on constitu-
tional equal protection grounds.23
The League of Women Voters of New Mexico (“the League”) be-
lieved the Secretary of State’s amendment to the administrative rule was
contrary to New Mexico’s voter intent statute.24 So eleven days before the
election, the League filed an emergency petition for writ of mandamus to
direct Secretary Herrera to enforce subsection (B)(4).25 The League
claimed that a refusal to enforce subsection (B)(4) would unnecessarily
disenfranchise the voters of New Mexico.26 The Secretary of State, how-
19. NMSA 1978, § 1-1-5.2 (2010). The fourth section, subsection (B)(4) of the
statute, which can be considered the catchall provision because it allows for vote
markings not enumerated elsewhere in the statute, was added to the statute as an
amendment in 2007. See 2007 N.M. LAWS 337 § 11. Throughout this article, the catch-
all provision, NMSA 1978, § 1-1-5.2(B)(4), will be referred to as (B)(4).
20. Att’y General Letter, supra note 2, at *1. R
21. Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus at ¶ 10; New Mexico ex rel.
League of Women Voters of New Mexico v. Herrera, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 5, 203 P.3d
94, 96.
22. See League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 5, 203 P.3d at 96.
23. Id. ¶ 6, 203 P.3d at 96.
24. Id. ¶ 4, 203 P.3d at 96.
25. Id. ¶ 3, 203 P.3d at 95.
26. Id. ¶ 4, 203 P.3d at 95. The League claimed that the regulation failed to com-
ply with the statute in two ways: “First, the regulation includes specific, narrow typo-
graphical or pictorial definitions . . . that are contrary to the clear intent of the
Legislature . . . .” Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus ¶ 11. The League rea-
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ever, believed that enforcement of subsection (B)(4) would be contrary
to federal law and used HAVA and Bush v. Gore to defend her actions.27
Secretary Herrera’s reason for declining to enforce subsection (B)(4)
stems from an advisory letter from the Attorney General that warned
that the subsection was unconstitutional.28 The letter found subsection
(B)(4) to be “inconsistent with HAVA and vulnerable to challenge on
constitutional equal protection grounds” because New Mexico’s method
for determining voter intent is virtually indistinguishable from the stan-
dard that was held to be unconstitutional in Bush v. Gore.29
A. Applicable Federal Law
1. Bush v. Gore
Secretary Herrera believed that New Mexico’s catchall provision,
subsection (B)(4), negated the possibility of a uniform, statewide inter-
pretation of voter intent because of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bush
v. Gore.30 In Bush v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme Court neither announced a
uniform standard for a recount nor identified a statutory standard.31 The
petition to the U.S. Supreme Court requested that the Court determine
whether the use of manual recounts without specific standards violates
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
soned the amendment was a sign the New Mexico Legislature anticipated that a ballot
would be marked in numerous ways and not necessarily as the ballot instructions
required. Id. ¶ 5; see also id. ¶ 8 (“The amendment indicates a legislative intent not to
require a voter to mark any particular form of ‘cross’ or ‘check’ in the voting response
area in order for a vote to be counted . . . . By incorporating no specific definition of
terms, the Legislature indicated its intent that the terms be used in their ordinary
sense.”). “Second, the regulation makes no provision at all to count votes that are
required to be counted pursuant to subparagraph B(4) of Section 1-9-4.2 . . . .” Id. ¶
12.
27. Id. ¶ 6, 203 P.3d at 96.
28. Id. ¶ 5, 203 P.3d at 96.
29. Id. ¶ 6, 203 P.3d at 96 (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. See id.
31. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (deciding against a recount in
Florida in the 2000 election). With Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court ended the 2000
Presidential election controversy by preventing the recount in Florida. Id. at 110. The
case originated in the Florida court system, where it was held that a legal vote is one
in which there is a “clear indication of the intent of the voter.” Id. at 102. The Florida
Supreme Court ordered the recount of thousands of ballots and determined that the
circuit court in Florida could order canvassing boards and public officials to conduct a
recount of any undervote. Id. at 102–103. An undervote occurs when one voter inten-
tionally or unintentionally fails to vote for one or more races on a ballot. Chavez v.
Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 401 n.4 (Ariz. App. 2009).
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ment.32 The Supreme Court found that a manual recount without specific
standards did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause, but specifically
left the question of which requirements were necessary to satisfy equal
protection up to the states.33
The U.S. Supreme Court requires minimum standards because with-
out them a state could allow disparate treatment among counties.34 The
U.S. Supreme Court held that a lack of uniformity dilutes the influence of
some citizens and enhances the influence of others, which “is hostile to
the one man, one vote basis of our representative government.”35 The
Court stated that “where a state court with the power to assure uniform-
ity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safe-
guards . . . there must be at least some assurance that the rudimentary
requirements of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satis-
fied.”36 The U.S. Supreme Court explained that the variances by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court’s order were indicative of a failure by the court to
meet those minimal procedural safeguards.37
The Supreme Court recognized that there was no federal constitu-
tional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States, and
it is state legislators that choose how those electors are chosen.38 When
the right to vote is vested in the people of a state, the Supreme Court
declared, “the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamen-
tal; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight ac-
corded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.”39
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether the Florida
Supreme Court had adopted recount procedures “consistent with its obli-
gation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its
electorate.”40
32. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 106–107.
35. Id. at 107 (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969)).
36. Id. at 109.
37. Id. at 107, 109. There were three examples of the Florida Supreme Court’s
ratification of the Florida statute that showed the failure to meet minimal procedural
safeguards. First, the Florida Supreme Court mandated a recount without further
standards, which ratified the disparate treatment by allowing each county to use vary-
ing standards to determine a legal vote. Id. at 107. Second, the Florida Supreme Court
did not specify who would recount the ballots. Id. at 109. Finally, the Florida Supreme
Court ignored the fact that some counties required recounts of all ballots as opposed
to just undervotes. Id. at 107–108.
38. Id. at 104.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 105.
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While the U.S. Supreme Court allows state courts to resolve voter
intent disputes, each state must do so on the basis of a set of uniform
standards.41 Florida has a general requirement that all legally cast votes
be counted based on the intent of the voter and leaves it to the Florida
Supreme Court to be the ultimate authority as to whether a vote can be
counted.42 The U.S. Supreme Court found this general requirement unob-
jectionable, but believed more specifics were required.43 According to the
Court, the state also had to have a set of uniform rules, based on recur-
ring circumstances that went beyond the general requirement so as to
help determine the intent of a voter.44 Therefore, for a state to succeed
against an equal protection challenge, a state’s voter intent statute must
create a level of uniformity in the administration of an election that sets
out a procedure based on past practices that explains what types of voter
intent will be counted in an election.
Stating in broad terms that a statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause because it values one person’s vote over another unless there are
uniform standards—but without actually enumerating those minimum
standards—has expansive implications.45 The U.S. Supreme Court was
prevented from being more specific because Florida’s statute lacked even
basic uniformity.46 Nevertheless, the requirement of uniform standards
must be followed by states when determining voter intent.
41. See id. at 106–109.
42. See id. at 105–106.
43. Id. As an illustration, the Supreme Court reasoned that it is not the voter
himself being recounted and reviewed. Id. at 106. Rather, the item being scrutinized is
the object the voter marked. Id. Testimony from lower courts found that in Florida
ballots could vary not just from county to county, but also from recount team to re-
count team all in the same county. Id. at 106.
44. Id. at 105–106.
45. See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDG-
ING EQUALITY FROM Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore 65–66 (2006). Years after the
opinion, there are questions regarding whose right was being protected by the Su-
preme Court in Bush v. Gore. Id. at 66. Hasen argues that it was not a voter’s right to
cast a vote, but instead the candidate’s right to ensure that their votes were counted
equally. Id. If it is the right of the candidate, then the analysis of treating a voter
equally is not for the purpose of protecting the voter, thus creating questions as to the
purpose of HAVA. However, the Supreme Court has stated its intent to ensure that
each voter is treated with equal dignity. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
46. HASEN, supra note 45, at 65–66. R
No doubt, the most important reason [to give a vague standard] to the Court
was the fact that the Florida Supreme Court had instructed the individuals
conducting the manual recounts to judge ballots to discern the “intent of the
voter,” but [the Florida Supreme Court] had failed to formulate uniform rules
to determine such intent, such as whether to count as a valid vote a ballot
whose chad is hanging by two corners.
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2. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
In response to Bush v. Gore and the requirement of only minimum
standards, Congress enacted the HAVA47 to address lingering concerns
about uniformity and to protect the integrity of the electoral process after
Bush v. Gore.48 HAVA does not define what constitutes a vote.49 HAVA’s
legislative purpose is to create minimum standards for election adminis-
tration and should not be construed to prevent a state from establishing
stricter requirements as long as they are not inconsistent with federal re-
quirements.50 Thus, HAVA is a floor and the statute’s language is clear
that states retain wide latitude in carrying out these basic requirements.51
Congress clearly intended to give states the discretion to define what con-
stitutes a vote, and the legislative history of HAVA further underscores
states’ latitude in supervising and implementing elections.52 HAVA’s need
for uniform and minimum statewide standards rests on consistent applica-
tion geographically within a given state.53
However, among its new regulations, HAVA requires a computer-
ized statewide voter registration system,54 creates a program to encourage
college students to participate in the electoral process,55 and sets federal
voting standards.56 The new federal voting standards include require-
ments allowing voters to verify their vote and mandating that voters be
able to change or correct an error.57 With respect to voter intent, HAVA
requires statewide “uniform and nondiscriminatory standards that define
what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote.”58
Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 15481 (2006).
48. Ray Martinez III, Greater Impartiality in Election Administration: Prudent
Steps Toward Improving Voter Confidence, 5 ELECTION L.J. 235, 240 (2006).
49. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 15481 (failing to define a vote).
50. State ex rel. League of Women Voters v. Herrera, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 25, 203
P.3d 94, 99–100.
51. See id. ¶ 25, 203 P.3d at 100.
52. Id. ¶ 26, 203 P.3d at 100.
53. See id. ¶ 27.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 15483 (2006).
55. Id. § 15521.
56. Id. § 15481.
57. Id. § 15481(a)(1)(A).
58. Id. § 15481(a)(6). Some have disputed whether this has gone far enough. For
example:
The statute legislated no legal redress for voters who are wrongfully excluded
from the voter rolls nor any criminal or civil penalties for officials who actu-
ally violate a person’s right to vote. There are no real teeth in the statute
when it comes to defending voting rights against government misconduct.
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B. New Mexico Supreme Court’s Decision in State ex rel. League of
Women Voters v. Herrera
On October 23, 2008, the League of Women Voters filed an emer-
gency writ of mandamus with the New Mexico Supreme Court urging the
court to require Secretary Herrera to enforce subsection (B)(4), which
permits ballots to be hand tallied when there is unanimous agreement
that the voter’s intent is clearly discernable.59 On October 28, 2008, the
New Mexico Supreme Court expedited oral arguments and issued the re-
quested writ.60 The legal question here was whether or not subsection
(B)(4) is within the spirit of the law as enunciated by Congress in HAVA,
and by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore.61
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that the uniform standards
needed in Bush v. Gore to ensure equal protection could be met while
still enforcing subsection (B)(4).62 Furthermore, the New Mexico Su-
preme Court found that HAVA does not exclude subsection (B)(4) be-
cause it sets minimal uniformity standards while leaving deference to
states to safeguard against voter disenfranchisement.63 Therefore, the
court’s issuance of a writ of mandamus to the Secretary of State to en-
force the statute was both necessary to protect a great public interest and
appropriate to prevent voter disenfranchisement in the 2008 election.64
Jamin Raskin, A Right-to-Vote Amendment for the U.S. Constitution: Confronting
America’s Structural Democracy Deficit, 3 ELECTION L.J. 559, 563 (2004).
59. State ex rel. League of Women Voters v. Herrera, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 3, 203
P.3d 94, 95.
60. Id. ¶ 7, 203 P.3d at 96. First, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered
whether the League had standing to bring an action in mandamus and whether it was
an appropriate remedy in this case. Id. ¶ 11, 203 P.3d at 97. According to the Supreme
Court, courts in New Mexico had the discretion to grant private parties standing to
“vindicate the public interest in cases presenting ‘issues of great public importance.’”
Id. (quoting State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 363, 524 P.2d 975, 979
(1974)). Here, the court stated that determining whether a person’s vote is valid rose
to the necessary level of importance and that establishing rules on how to determine if
a vote is valid was of even greater importance; therefore, the League had the neces-
sary standing to bring the writ. Id. ¶ 11, 203 P.3d at 97. The court also rooted its power
in the New Mexico Constitution to issue writs of mandamus “against all state of-
ficers,” N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3, and stated that “[m]andamus is appropriate to com-
pel state officers to perform a statutory duty.” Id. ¶ 12, 203 P.3d at 97. The court
stated that the Secretary of State is a state officer and she must follow the Election
Code. Id.
61. Id. ¶ 10, 203 P.3d at 97.
62. Id. ¶ 22, 203 P.3d at 99.
63. Id. ¶ 31, 203 P.3d at 101.
64. Id. ¶ 32, 203 P.3d at 101.
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1. Balancing Uniformity and the Risk of Voter Disenfranchisement
The Secretary of State argued that the catchall provision, subsection
(B)(4), although a state standard, could be interpreted differently
throughout the state and thus would be a violation of equal protection.65
The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected the Secretary of State’s argu-
ment and held subsection (B)(4) not to be a violation of equal protection
because New Mexico’s statute provides more uniformity than the Florida
statute in Bush v. Gore and is therefore easily distinguishable from that
case’s holding.66 The New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that Florida’s
election law violated equal protection principles because “local election
officials were to discern the intent of the voter, without anything more
specific.”67 The court distinguished the current case because the guide-
lines in New Mexico “provide clear context and guidance for local elec-
tion officials.”68 As an example, New Mexico’s Supreme Court found
uniformity in the requirement that the election board be unanimous in a
finding of voter intent.69 This was not the case in Bush v. Gore, where
Florida had no requirement that election judges reach unanimous agree-
ment and allowed counties to use different standards for determining
voter intent.70 Uniformity in the New Mexico statute was obtained be-
cause all of the standards laid out in the statute, as minimal as they are,
are applicable to every county.71
But uniformity was not the New Mexico Supreme Court’s only con-
cern. The court stated that exact uniformity across the state would disre-
65. Id. ¶ 19, 203 P.3d at 98.
66. See id. ¶ 18, 203 P.3d at 98. Even though Justice Bosson reviewed Bush v.
Gore, he claimed it was of limited assistance. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court
recognized that the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore limited its holding to the
narrow circumstances of that particular situation because of the complex nature of
election processes. Id. ¶ 16, 203 P.3d at 98 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109
(2000)). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court painstakingly worked to limit the preceden-
tial weight of Bush v. Gore. Id. ¶ 17, 203 P.3d at 98. Nevertheless, the New Mexico
Supreme Court noted that many scholars and other courts have used Bush v. Gore to
challenge voting systems, to review recount procedures, as well as to determine voter
intent; therefore, the New Mexico Supreme Court seemed to suggest there must be
some precedential weight to Bush v. Gore regardless of the limits the Supreme Court
placed on it. Id.
67. Id. ¶ 16, 203 P.3d at 97 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bush, 531
U.S. at 105–106).
68. Id. ¶ 18, 203 P.3d at 98. The court expected the Secretary of State to follow
the statute and regulations “and . . . [to] make a forceful effort to achieve uniformity
in interpreting ballots.” Id. ¶ 19, 203 P.3d at 98.
69. Id. ¶ 18, 203 P.3d at 98.
70. Id. ¶ 18, 203 P.3d at 98 (citing Bush, 531 U.S. at 106–107).
71. Id.
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gard the discretion that local officials need in order to “guard against
[voter] disenfranchisement.”72 Furthermore, the court questioned how the
Secretary of State would be able to capture every valid expression of
voter intent using only machines.73 The court stated, “An overly mechani-
cal or formulaic approach might lead to unnecessary disenfranchisement
of voters who mark their ballot in ways not accounted for in official
guidelines, but which nonetheless, to the human eye, would appear as
clear expressions of voter intent.”74
Therefore, the court found that the “hypothetical possibility that fu-
ture violations may occur is an insufficient basis for striking down Subsec-
tion (B)(4)” for a failure to allow exact uniformity when balanced against
this risk of voter disenfranchisement.75 The court found that subsection
(B)(4), in conjunction with a set of examples from the Secretary of State
in the administrative code, demonstrated the type of uniformity that the
U.S. Supreme Court found lacking in Bush v. Gore.76
2. Sufficiency Under HAVA
The New Mexico Supreme Court also found that enforcement of the
statute is consistent with HAVA.77 HAVA requires “that states adopt uni-
form and nondiscriminatory standards that define what constitutes a vote
and what will be counted as a vote.”78 The court read this section to re-
quire a “basic level of consistency” for how local officials interpret a bal-
lot as a valid expression of voter intent.79 Thus, the court found that
HAVA’s legislative history shows bipartisan support for allowing state of-
ficials to retain discretion in carrying out elections and rejecting national
codification of the entire process.80
72. Id. ¶ 19, 203 P.3d at 98.
73. Id. ¶ 21, 203 P.3d at 99.
74. Id. The court was concerned that machines are programmed to recognize only
specific markings, and the machine will fail to read valid expressions of voter intent
that should be counted in an election. Id. According to the New Mexico Supreme
Court, the result of refusing to allow humans to review ballots for voter intent is
unnecessary disenfranchisement. Id.
75. Id. ¶ 19, 203 P.3d at 98.
76. Id. ¶ 22, 203 P.3d at 99.
77. Id. ¶ 23, 203 P.3d at 99.
78. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 15481(a)(6) (2006)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
79. Id. ¶ 25, 203 P.3d at 99.
80. Id. ¶ 26, 203 P.3d at 100. As an example, the court quotes Senator Chris Dodd
as stating that “nothing in this bill establishes a Federal definition of when a voter is
registered or how a vote is counted,” Id. (citing 148 CONG. REC. S10488 (2002)), and
that “[s]tates ought to have the flexibility of deciding what system works best for
them.” Id. (citing 148 CONG. REC. S10412, S10421 (2002)).
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The New Mexico Supreme Court held that subsection (B)(4) “pro-
vides sufficient assurances that county clerks in various parts of the state
will interpret voter’s intent in a uniform and nondiscriminatory fashion. It
is a clear, statewide standard, and therefore meets the requirements of
HAVA.”81 As further support for its conclusion that the New Mexico stat-
ute is valid under HAVA, the court analyzed what it considered to be
similar statutes that had been upheld in other states.82 Therefore, The
Court concluded that the voter intent statute with subsection (B)(4) met
the basic requirements of uniformity set forth in Bush v. Gore and HAVA
because the essential elements of uniformity were present in the statute.83
II. RELIANCE ON OTHER STATE STATUTES
Beyond proclaiming that each person must have an equal vote,84 the
U.S. Supreme Court has never voiced a standard for determining a valid
vote.85 This has led to states choosing varying election methods, and al-
though those methods are slightly different from state to state, they can
be divided into two categories: a voter intent standard and a ballot in-
struction standard. A voter intent standard allows a ballot to be counted
where the intent of the voter can be determined.86 This first category of
determining a ballot’s validity focuses on whether or not the voter’s in-
tent is clear, rather than whether the voter followed the directions.87 New
81. Id. ¶ 27, 203 P.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Id. ¶ 29, 203 P.3d at 101.
83. See id. ¶ 25, 203 P.3d at 100–101. Bush v. Gore dealt specifically with disparate
treatment within a single state and found ballots could vary not only from county to
county, but also from one recount team to a different recount team in the same
county. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–106 (2000).
84. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
85. See HASEN, supra note 45, at 65–66. Some scholars found it appropriate for R
the Court in Bush v. Gore to have articulated an unmanageable standard because the
Court’s holding was unprecedented and not in line with any social consensus about
the proper standard to use in the recounting of ballots. Id. Furthermore, there was no
real public opinion before this controversy. Id. However, voting is a fundamental right
and as states diverge, there may be a time in which the Supreme Court will have to
review the treatment of voter intent and determine whether or not the disparate treat-
ment of one state’s citizens compared to another rises to a level that requires further
intervention by the Supreme Court. Id.
86. See League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 28, 203 P.3d at 100–101.
87. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 1-1-5.2 (2010). Several other states use similar lan-
guage and follow similar guidelines, even if the statute is phrased in the negative.
League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 28, 203 P.3d at 100–101. Phrased in the
negative means that instead of saying “the voter’s intent will be considered,” some
statutes state that “ballots where voter intent cannot be determined do not count.” Id.
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Mexico’s statute with subsection (B)(4), is an example of a voter intent
standard88 because it the subsection creates a focus on the voter’s actions.
The second method, in contrast, focuses on whether or not the voter fol-
lowed the ballot instructions,89 which creates more uniformity across a
state because it limits the available and valid expressions of voter intent.90
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that New Mexico’s voter
intent statute, with subsection (B)(4), gives sufficient guidance to meet
the minimum uniformity requirements set forth by HAVA and Bush v.
Gore. As proof, the New Mexico Supreme Court cited to other states’
statutes that it believed were similar to the New Mexico statute.91 The
statutes cited by the New Mexico Supreme Court are distinguishable
from New Mexico’s statute in one of two ways: first, the foreign statutes
are constructed to be based on the ballot’s instructions rather than on the
voter’s intent, or second, the statutes are construed to produce more uni-
formity than is required by New Mexico’s statute.
A. Dissimilar Constructions
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion concluded that the New
Mexico statute did not violate equal protection, in part, because states
with similar laws have not been overturned on equal protection grounds.92
But the statutes that the New Mexico Supreme Court considered differ in
that they lack a catchall provision like subsection (B)(4) and instead use
other ways to balance the risk of voter disenfranchisement with a uniform
counting procedure.93 As demonstrated below, the New Mexico Supreme
Court improperly relied on dissimilar state statutes because, unlike New
Mexico’s statute, those statutes focus on the ballot’s instructions.
1. Missouri
Missouri follows a ballot instruction standard.94 Its statute varies
from New Mexico’s statute because it does not possess the catchall provi-
The implementation of a negative voter intent standard is still the same as one in the
affirmative. See id.
88. League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 28, 203 P.3d at 100–101.
89. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.456(3)(1) (West 2006) (“The judges shall
count votes marked substantially in accordance with this section and section 115.456
when the intent of the voter seems clear.”).
90. See id.
91. League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 29, 203 P.3d at 101. The court
cited to voter intent statutes from: Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Maine,
Montana, and Utah. Id. ¶ 28, 203 P.3d at 100–101.
92. Id. ¶ 30, 203 P.3d at 101.
93. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.456(3)(1) (West 2006).
94. Id.
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sion that New Mexico uses to balance uniform statutory interpretation
and voter disenfranchisement. Rather, Missouri’s statute requires voter
intent to be determined by set criteria.95 The Missouri statute’s limited
criteria includes only distinguishing marks adjacent to the name of the
candidate or issue, or the circling of the name of the candidate or issue
preference.96 This creates a very limited list of allowable marks.
Missouri courts have found the statute sufficient to guard against
disenfranchisement without a catchall phrase by being very specific with
the marks allowed on different ballots. Missouri’s statute enumerates
how to determine voter intent by the type of voting system.97 For in-
stance, when there is a recount for punch card ballots, the statute has a
list of guidelines to follow that focus on the state of the ballot.98 Likewise,
for tabulators and paper ballots, the statute has a list of criteria that a
voter’s mark has to meet before it can be analyzed for voter intent.99 The
first allowable mark is one “in the printed oval or divided arrow adjacent
to the name of the candidate or issue preference.”100 The second allowa-
ble mark is one next to the candidate’s name or ballot issue,101 and the
third allowable mark is when the name of the candidate or issue prefer-
ence is circled.102 However, there is no regulation that explains what a
distinguishing mark adjacent to the name of the candidate or preference
means.103 Nevertheless, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that ballots
with marks made in, over, or around the candidate’s party affiliation
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. § 115.456(1). The guidelines are used when inspecting the ballots. Id. It
includes appointing a bipartisan team to inspect all ballots to look for things like
hanging chads. Id. For example, if the team finds the chad is hanging by less than two
corners, it shall be removed. Id.
99. See id. § 115.456(2)–(3). A similar statute also requires an election judge’s ini-
tials on the ballot unless it can be determined that the lack of initials is due to the
judge’s mistake. Id. § 115.457. However, while lower courts have determined that un-
authenticated ballots should be counted even in absence of some sort of obvious ir-
regularity, Dolan v. Powers, 260 S.W.3d 376, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008), the Missouri
Court of Appeals determined that there should be some discovery on whether there
was a mistake or irregularity. Id. at 385.
100. Id. § 115.456(2)(3)(b)(a). Missouri’s Secretary of State revised standards for
optical scan ballots after HAVA so as to fulfill the requirements of Bush v. Gore,
which mandated uniform statewide standards “beyond vague directives to determine
the intent of the voter.” Dolan, 260 S.W.3d 376, 380 (2008) (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 105–106 (2000) (internal quotations marks omitted).
101. Id. § 115.456(2)(3)(b)(b).
102. Id. § 115.456(2)(3)(b)(c).
103. Dolan, 260 S.W.3d at 381.
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rather than directly in the oval are sufficient to be considered adjacent to
the candidate and therefore are valid expressions of voter intent.104
While these instructions guard against discrimination by allowing
valid expressions of voter intent outside of those enumerated in a list,
Missouri has found ways to ensure statewide uniform application. Stray
marks in Missouri are not sufficient to show voter intent.105 Furthermore,
stray marks are distinguished from other marks that are closely related to
marks enumerated in the Missouri statute.106 The Secretary of State in
Missouri adopted this approach when she omitted a provision from the
election code that would have made hesitation marks a showing of voter
intent.107 Thus when an office had an oval filled in for one candidate and a
mark in another candidate’s oval for the same office, as long as that mark
is infinitesimal, there is not a clear overvote,108 and the voter’s intent can
be determined.109
2. Alaska
The Alaska ballot instruction standard is similar to Missouri’s stat-
ute in that it specifies the allowable ballot markings. Specifically,
A voter may mark a ballot only by filling in, making “X” marks,
diagonal, horizontal, or vertical marks, solid marks . . . [and] [t]he
mark specified in (1) of this subsection shall be counted only if it
is substantially inside the oval provided, or touching the oval so as
to indicate clearly that the voter intended the particular oval to be
designated.110
The Alaska Supreme Court, in Edgmon v. State analyzed this statute and
made determinations on the validity of stray lines and whether or not
they are valid expressions of voter intent.111
Edgmon centers on an election for a state representative position
where the State Division of Elections (“Division”) certified a primary
election in which the incumbent won by a margin of one vote after the
104. Id. at 382.
105. Id. at 382–83. States with ballot instruction standards are not in agreement on
whether stray marks can show voter intent or what is included in a stray mark. See
Edgmon v. State, 152 P.3d 1154, 1158 (Alaska 2007).
106. See Dolan, 260 S.W.3d at 381.
107. Id. at 382.
108. An overvote occurs “when a voter marks more names than there are persons
to be elected to the office.” Edgmon v. State, 152 P.3d 1154, 1155 (Alaska 2007) (cita-
tion and internal quotations marks omitted).
109. Dolan, 260 S.W.3d at 382–83.
110. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.15.360(a)(1)(5) (West 2003).
111. Edgmon, 152 P.3d at 1155.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\41-2\NMX207.txt unknown Seq: 16 24-JAN-12 10:46
586 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
Division declared six ballots ineligible to be counted.112 In relying on the
state’s rules for counting ballots, the Division determined three of the
ballots ineligible because of an overvote.113 The challenger appealed the
Division’s decision on those three ballots to the Supreme Court of
Alaska.114
The Supreme Court of Alaska had to interpret the state’s voter in-
tent statute to determine if these three ballots with stray markings elicited
a voter’s intent and were therefore an overvote.115 Alaska’s statute fol-
lows the ballot instruction standard, but by reading the statute’s provi-
sions together, the court found that an overvote occurs only when the
second mark on the ballot shows intent to vote for a second candidate.116
The court rejected the view that having marks in more ovals for a contest
than allowed creates an overvote that negates the entire ballot; instead,
while the statute finds voter intent to be important, it requires a correct
mark as well as clear voter intent.117
Two of the ballots in Edgmon that the Division claimed to be
overvoted “had completely shaded ovals next to [the challenger’s] name
but also contained tracings that touched the edge of the ovals next to [the
incumbent’s] name.”118 The court reviewed each voter’s entire ballot,
wherein each voter filled in the ovals for the other races and relied on
each ballot to show each voter’s choice and each voter did not, in any
race, trace an oval to indicate his or her intent.119 The court reasoned
then, that these votes, in which the ovals were completely shaded next to
the challenger and traced next to the incumbent, showed the voter’s in-
tention to vote for the challenger because each voter had nowhere else on
the ballot traced an oval to show his or her intent.120
The Alaska court followed similar reasoning for the third ballot
claimed to be overvoted. This ballot had an X in the oval next to the
incumbent’s name and had a line that crossed out the challenger’s name
and the oval next to the challenger’s name.121 Again, reviewing the entire
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Alaska courts review questions of statutory interpretation using an inde-
pendent review standard by deciding “the rule of law that is most persuasive in light
of precedent, reason, and policy.” Id. at 1156 (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284
n.6 (Alaska 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id. at 1157.
116. Id. at 1157.
117. Id. at 1158.
118. Id. at 1155.
119. Id. at 1158.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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ballot, the court found the voter had indicated his choice for the other
races using an X in the oval next to the candidate’s name.122 In the con-
tested race, the incumbent’s oval had an X while the challenger had a line
through his name and his oval.123 The court reasoned that the line through
his name was a “stray marking” and showed intent to vote against that
candidate.124 Alaska’s statute requires a mark to be counted only if it is
substantially in the designated area.125 However, Alaska seems to be mov-
ing toward an interpretation of their statute that places more emphasis on
a voter’s intent rather than on the ballot’s instructions. As recently as the
2010 U.S. Senate election controversy, where Senator Lisa Murkowski
was defeated in the primary but ran and won as a write-in candidate, the
Supreme Court of Alaska restated that a voter’s intent is paramount.126
The court maintained its strong and consistent policy of construing stat-
utes in order to effectuate voter intent even though Alaska’s statute—
unlike New Mexico’s statute—has a finite list of valid voter intent expres-
sions.127 In Alaska’s most recent electoral controversy, Joe Miller, who
defeated Senator Murkowski in the Republican Primary, challenged sev-
eral thousand write-in ballots that misspelled Senator Murkowski’s
name.128 The Supreme Court of Alaska stated its reluctance to disen-
franchise voters and affirmed it would not discount such votes because of
a mere mistake.129 The Alaska Supreme Court found that “abbreviations,
misspellings, or other minor variations in the form of the name of a candi-
date [would] be disregarded in determining the validity of the ballot, so
long as the intention of the voter [could] be ascertained.”130
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. While the court seemed to reason that while there is an intent to vote
against the challenger, it should also be considered a stray marking and thus should
not be interpreted because it is not a proper mark. Id.
125. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.15.360 (West 2003). This is unlike New Mexico’s
statute, where the catchall provision only requires the judges to agree unanimously on
the voter’s intent, no matter where the mark is or what the mark may be. See NMSA
1978, § 1-1-5.2 (2010).
126. Miller v. Treadwell, 245 P.3d 867, 869 (Alaska 2010).
127. See id.; supra text accompanying 110 (the relevant Alaska statute specifically R
states that a voter may mark a ballot only by “filling in, making ‘X’ marks, diagonal,
horizontal, or vertical marks, solid marks . . . that are clearly spaced in the oval oppo-
site the name of the candidate”).
128. Miller, 245 P.3d at 872.
129. Id. at 869.
130. See id. at 869. This appears to be more like New Mexico’s voter intent stan-
dard than other standards that have a finite list of allowable markings. Compare
NMSA 1978, § 1-1-5.2 (2010), with MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.456(3)(1) (Alaska’s statute,
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3. Iowa
Iowa, a state with a voter intent law similar to Missouri and
Alaska,131 has found that by failing to make a specific mark, the voter
violated “a mandatory provision of the election law in casting the bal-
lot.”132 Iowa’s statute requires that instructions on the ballot describe “the
appropriate mark to be used by the voter.”133 For each paper ballot, the
voting mark “may be a cross or check which shall be placed in the voting
targets opposite the names of candidates.”134
In Taylor v. Central City Community School District, the Iowa Su-
preme Court addressed the issue of a proper mark in an election to issue
bonds and a tax levy to pay for school district improvements.135 There
were four ballots disputed by the opponents of the measure.136 The direc-
tions for answering the ballot in question were printed on each ballot and
required voters to fill the oval target to the left of the words “Yes” or
“No.”137 The recount board rejected one ballot on the grounds that the
voter’s intent was unclear since the mark was outside the voting target
and therefore did not meet the statute’s ballot instruction standard.138 The
board counted the remaining three ballots because the voters had fol-
lowed the instructions.139 The final vote count from the recount board had
the measure failing by one vote.140 The board’s decision was appealed on
the basis that the voter’s intent in the final ballot was not discernable and
therefore three “No” votes should have been included in the final
count.141
The Iowa Supreme Court recognized the comprehensive set of rules
and procedures that governed elections in that state, citing statutes that
although appearing facially like Missouri’s ballot instruction standard, operates much
more similarly to New Mexico’s statute).
131. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.456; ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.15.360 (West 2003).
132. Taylor v. Cent. City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 733 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Iowa 2007) (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted).
133. IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.92 (West 1997).
134. Id.
135. 733 N.W.2d at 656.
136. Id.
137. Id. The directions specifically stated, “[F]or an affirmative vote on any ques-
tion upon this ballot, mark the word ‘YES’ like this [example of a filled oval]. For a
negative vote, make a similar mark in the box marked ‘NO.’” Id.
138. Id. at 657.
139. Id. at 656.
140. Id. at 661. The “Yes” votes totaled 59.89 percent in an election where 60 per-
cent was needed to pass the measure. Id. The first ballot had the word “NO” entirely
blacked out by the voter whereas the other three had the “O” in the word “NO” filled
in. Id. at 656.
141. Id. at 657.
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addressed the form of the ballot and that instructed officials on how to
adapt the notice on the ballot to show voters where to mark.142 The con-
stitutionality of those instructions was not challenged.143 However, the
statutory instructions144 require voters “to mark their ballots by placing an
‘X,’ checking, or filling in the oval target next to the word ‘Yes’ or
‘No.’”145 By failing to make one of those particular marks, the voter vio-
lated “a mandatory provision of the election law in casting the ballot.”146
So the Iowa Supreme Court did not consider whether the intent of each
voter was clear in the disputed ballots because the each voter had not
made the correct mark.147 Notably, for the court to review the voter’s in-
tent the challengers needed to make a direct constitutional challenge to
the statutory requirement of ballot instructions.148
4. Comparison to New Mexico’s Statute
In New Mexico, the purpose of the catchall provision is to prevent a
voter’s intent from being invalidated because of a simple mark, and with-
out the catchall provision there would be unnecessary disenfranchise-
ment.149 Missouri, Iowa, and Alaska have more stringent voting statute
requirements than New Mexico.150
A statutory ballot instruction standard like Missouri’s, which does
not contain a catchall provision, is similar to what the New Mexico Attor-
ney General and Secretary of State were suggesting in League of Women
Voters.151 However, the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected that sugges-
tion, concluding that the absence of a catchall provision puts too much
emphasis on uniformity thereby creating an overly mechanical approach
142. Id. at 659.
143. Id. at 660.
144. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 49.46, 49.42 (West 1997).
145. Taylor, 733 N.W.2d at 659.
146. Id. at 660 (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id. at 660–61. Although the Iowa Supreme Court did not get to the issue of
whether the intent of the voters was clear, the court recognized “the possibility that
the voters in this case intended to vote ‘No’ on each ballot, particularly on the three
ballots where the voters filled in the letter ‘o’ in the word ‘No’ and left the oval target
immediately to the left of the word “No” blank.” Id.
148. See id. (“[T]he goal in an election contest is to give effect to the venerable
democratic right to vote . . . . Yet, our legislature has established certain basic voting
requirements that we are obligated to enforce in the absence of a successful constitu-
tional challenge to the statute.”).
149. NMSA § 1978, 1-1-5.2 (2010).
150. Compare NMSA § 1-1-5.2, with IOWA CODE ANN. § 49.92 (West 1997), MO.
ANN. STAT. § 115.456 (West 2006), and ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 15.15.360 (West 2003).
(New Mexico’s statute is the only one of the four with a catchall provision).
151. See Att’y General Letter, supra note 2, at *1. R
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that might lead to unnecessary disenfranchisement.152 Because part of the
New Mexico Supreme Court’s ruling relied on the validity of Missouri’s
statute being valid under federal law, the lack of a catchall provision in
the Missouri statute lends very little support to the validity to the New
Mexico statute.153
Furthermore, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s reasoning would
mean that Missouri, Iowa, and Alaska’s statutes would lead to unneces-
sary disenfranchisement in their application because they are stricter in
their uniformity requirements. Each state’s constructions lack a catchall
voter intent provision and that may be irrelevant—the courts of these
other states have implied a voter intent requirement even though they do
not fit exactly in the ballot instruction scheme. Moreover, the statutes
have not been challenged in the Supreme Court that the balancing that
these three states have struck between disenfranchisement and uniform-
ity violate the holding in Bush v. Gore or HAVA principles. Therefore,
these statutes are not as helpful in determining whether New Mexico’s
statute violates equal protection as suggested by the New Mexico Su-
preme Court in League of Women Voters because each statute is con-
structed differently and is still enforceable in that state.
B. A Similarly Constructed Statute, but a Dissimilar Interpretation
The Montana statute has a similar construction to New Mexico’s
voter intent-based statute. Subsection (B)(4) of the New Mexico statute
states that a hand-tallied ballot will be counted if “the presiding judge
and election judges for the precinct unanimously agree that the voter’s
intent is clearly discernable.”154 Montana’s statute similarly requires that
each questionable vote on a ballot be set aside and reviewed by a count-
ing board.155 If a majority of the counting board members agree that the
voter’s intent can be clearly determined, “the vote is valid and must be
counted according to the voter’s intent.”156
Nevertheless, the Montana statute has been interpreted by its state
supreme court in a way that puts more emphasis on uniformity than the
New Mexico Supreme Court claims is required by Bush v. Gore and
HAVA.157 The Montana Supreme Court seemed to suggest that voters
had to follow the ballot’s specific guidelines irrespective of the voter’s
152. State ex rel. League of Women Voters v. Herrera, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 21, 203
P.3d 94, 99.
153. Id. ¶ 28, 201 P.3d at 100–101.
154. NMSA 1978, § 1-1-5.2 (2010).
155. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-15-206(4)(a)(i) (2009).
156. Id. § 13-15-206(4)(a)(ii)
157. See Big Spring v. Jore, 2005 MT-64, ¶ 34, 326 Mont. 256, 109 P.3d 219.
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intent.158 Quoting an earlier case, the Montana Court in 2004 reaffirmed
the challenge of attempting to determine voter intent:
So many questions arise from the contested ballot itself as to the
intentions of the voter, and the confusion that results from at-
tempting to find a consistency in his method of voting that it be-
comes clear that his ballot should be rejected . . . . The voter’s
intent and choice do not clearly appear.159
The Montana Supreme Court requires that when a voter’s intent is ana-
lyzed, the state must ensure that the statute is being applied with strict
uniformity across the state.160
In a 2005 case, Big Spring v. Jore, the Montana Supreme Court had
evidence that several disputed ballots had markings similar to those
found on ballots that had been disqualified, as well as others that had
been counted.161 In this challenge, several ballots contained a possible
overvote where one of the areas was marked with an X.162 The candidate-
challenger claimed that those ballots could not be counted because the
elector’s choice could not be clearly determined.163 On five of the dis-
puted ballots, the ovals for both candidates had been filled in creating an
overvote, but one of the ovals on each ballot had also been marked with
an X.164 While other states have used an X as a revocation of intent,165
Montana has a history of using an X as a method to identify the elector’s
choice.166 However, there were reports that an X in the voting area may
have been treated differently from county to county.167
158. See id. (stating that the ballots in question were spoiled “because filling in two
ovals in the same designated area and then placing an X in one oval” did not follow
voter instructions).
159. Id. ¶ 33, 109 P.3d at 326 (quoting Rennie v. Nistler, 217 Mont. 412, 417, 735
P.2d 1124, 1127 (1987)).
160. Id. ¶ 28, 109 P.3d at 225.
161. Id. ¶ 26, 109 P.3d at 225.
162. Id. ¶ 25, 109 P.3d at 224.
163. Id. ¶ 30, 109 P.3d at 225.
164. Id. ¶ 30, 109 P.3d at 225–26.
165. See, e.g., In re Primary Election Ballot Disputes 2004, 2004 ME 99, ¶ 28, 857
A.2d 494, 503.
166. See Big Spring, 2005-MT-64, ¶ 31, 109 P.3d at 226.
167. Id. One of the candidates compounded the difficulty with determining voting
intent. That candidate, Cross, ran advertisements that stated, “Cross out the competi-
tion and vote for the Cross that matters.” Id. ¶ 32, 109 P.3d at 226. The Montana
Supreme Court discounted both the ballots that made an “x” in the oval for Cross and
invalidated five ballots for his opponent with similar markings. Id. ¶ 36, 109 P.3d at
227.
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Because voters are specifically instructed to request a replacement
ballot if they make a mistake, the Montana Supreme Court questioned
the fairness of counting these votes in light of the voters who correctly
completed the ballot.168 In one county, for example, sixty-seven individu-
als obtained a new ballot.169 The court determined that if they had al-
lowed the ballots of those voters who did not follow the law to be
counted, the law-abiding voters would receive unequal treatment because
they followed the instructions.170 The court therefore invalidated the im-
properly completed ballots to ensure uniform application of the statute.171
In sum, despite having a statute that focuses on the voter’s intent, Mon-
tana’s Supreme Court has established rules similar to those required in a
state with a strict ballot instruction standard.
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s interpretation of New Mexico’s
statute, compared to Montana, is much less rigid. The Montana Supreme
Court was concerned that a failure to strictly interpret Montana’s statute
may lead to unequal treatment.172 The New Mexico Supreme Court, on
the other hand, simply expects the Secretary of State to follow the statute
and regulations and to “make a forceful effort to achieve uniformity in
interpreting ballots.”173 And they further found that exact uniformity
across New Mexico would disregard the discretion that local officials
need in order to “guard against disenfranchisement.”174 Therefore, even
though the Montana statute closely resembles New Mexico’s statute,
Montana has more rigidly interpreted the uniformity required by its stat-
ute. Thus, Montana’s statute, because of its interpretation, does not ad-
vance the proposition that the New Mexico statute is within the
requirements of Bush v. Gore and HAVA, as the New Mexico Supreme
Court held it did.
C. Summary
Statutes like those in Missouri require the voter’s intent to be deter-
mined using a set of criteria but lack a catchall provision as found in New
168. Id. ¶ 34, 109 P.3d at 226.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. ¶ 36, 109 P.3d at 227.
172. See id. ¶ 34, 109 P.3d at 226.
173. State ex rel. League of Women Voters v. Herrera, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 19, 203
P.3d 94, 98.
174. Id. “An overly mechanical or formulaic approach might lead to unnecessary
disenfranchisement of voters who mark their ballot in ways not accounted for in offi-
cial guidelines, but which nonetheless, to the human eye, would appear as clear ex-
pressions of voter intent.” Id. ¶ 21, 109 P.3d at 99.
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Mexico’s statute.175 But the courts in states like Missouri have found valid
expressions of voter intent, even though such expressions are not enu-
merated in the statute and are without a catchall section like subsection
(B)(4).176 On the other hand, courts in states such as Montana have
strictly construed statutes similar to New Mexico’s statute to count a
mark only if it is substantially in the designated area.177 However, in New
Mexico, the whole point of the catchall provision is to prevent a voter’s
intent from being unnecessarily invalidated solely because of an “incor-
rect” mark.178 As a result, the New Mexico Supreme Court’s comparison
of statutes from other states, which the court considers similar to New
Mexico’s statute, does not necessarily support the contention that New
Mexico’s statute has the correct balance between uniformity and voter
disenfranchisement, either because of the way those state statutes are
written or because of how those statutes are construed.179
III. THE VARIATION IN STATE STATUTES NATIONALLY
Even though the statutes cited in League of Women Voters do not
directly support the New Mexico Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
New Mexico statute, the variance in voter intent statutes and caselaw na-
tionally is so great that any statute, including New Mexico’s, is valid so
long as the statute meets the minimal federal requirements of HAVA and
Bush v. Gore. Scholars have noted that the Supreme Court in Bush v.
Gore failed to give the lower courts the tools to determine the validity of
their voter intent statutes.180 However, Bush v. Gore and HAVA have, at
a minimum, set basic uniformity guidelines for states to follow.181 Never-
theless, because the guidelines are incomplete, it leaves state courts to
undertake different approaches to deal with voter intent questions.182
The New Mexico Attorney General noted that most states have
amended their statutes to “incorporate more precise criteria for deter-
mining whether a vote should be counted.”183 However, states like New
175. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.456(3)(1) (West 2006).
176. See, e.g., Dolan v. Powers, 260 S.W.3d 376, 381–82 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008)
177. See supra notes 158–171 and accompanying text. R
178. See NMSA 1978, § 1-1-5.2 (2010); League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003,
¶ 19, 203 P.3d at 98.
179. League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 28, 203 P.3d at 100–101 (citing
MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-15-206(4)(a)(ii) (2009), MO. ANN. STAT. § 115.4563(3)).
180. See HASEN, supra note 45, at 66. R
181. League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 25, 203 P.3d at 100.
182. HASEN, supra note 45, at 66. R
183. Att’y General Letter, supra note 2, at *2 n.1. R
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York and Maine, which are referenced in a footnote in Bush v. Gore,184
take different approaches to balance uniformity with voter disen-
franchisement.185 Yet, assuming HAVA is a floor, these states demon-
strate that New Mexico’s statute falls within the range of other states’
requirements and therefore does not violate HAVA’s requirements.186
Even though the statutes the New Mexico Supreme Court cites are
not necessarily of assistance, as this Part will show, states balance uni-
formity against voter disenfranchisement so differently that it would be
hard for a statute like New Mexico’s voter intent statute, which meets the
federal minimums of HAVA and Bush v. Gore, to be found unconstitu-
tional. Therefore, New Mexico’s statute is at least inside the spectrum of
valid state statutes and should not violate federal law.
A. Maine
Maine’s voter intent standard, although similar to states with stan-
dards that focus more on the ballot instructions,187 places the determina-
tion of voter intent above the instructions printed on the ballot.188 Maine
also removes the courts from the process for general elections, but does
give state courts jurisdiction over recount appeals in primary elections.189
Furthermore, Maine requires that only when the number of valid chal-
lenged ballots affects the outcome of the election do the courts need to
determine voter intent.190
In the primary for the 2008 general election, the Supreme Court of
Maine was not presented with any appeals where the result rested on the
court’s determination of voter intent.191 However, in the primary for the
2004 general election, there were two races where the Maine Supreme
Court’s determination of voter intent changed the outcome of the elec-
184. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 124, n. 2 (2000).
185. See N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 9-112(1) (McKinney 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21-A, § 696(4) (2009).
186. See League of Women Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 25, 203 P.3d at 99.
187. See, e.g., Edgmon v. State, 152 P.3d 1154, 1155 (Alaska 2007) (explaining the
requirement to follow the ballot instructions).
188. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 696(4) (2009) (“If a voter marks the
voter’s ballot in a manner that differs from the instructions at the top of the ballot but
in such a manner that it is possible to determine the voter’s choice, then the vote for
the office or question concerned must be counted.”).
189. In re Primary Election Ballot Disputes 2004, 2004 ME 99, ¶ 17, 857 A.2d 494,
500.
190. Id. ¶ 20, 857 A.2d at 501.
191. See In re Primary Election Ballot Disputes 2008, 2008 ME 17, 955 A.2d 216.
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tions.192 In the 2004 Senate District Twenty Primary, the Maine Supreme
Court found that a check mark was valid because the courts could discern
the voter’s choice.193 Four ballots were being disputed for that reason.194
One had three marks, two in the indicator boxes and one check mark
next to a candidate’s name.195 The court looked to the significance of the
marking within the indicator box as well as the proximity of a mark to a
candidate’s name as evidence of the voter’s choice.196 When the court re-
viewed the voter’s entire ballot, it found that the mark was consistent
with the manner in which the voter cast his votes.197 The second ballot
contained four marks.198 This voter had placed three Xs in the indicator
boxes on the ballot.199 The fourth mark was in the indicator box for a
write-in candidate, but no name was written.200 Instead, the voter drew an
arrow from the mark he had made in the write-in indicator box and
pointed the arrow at another candidate in the same race.201 The court
determined the voter’s intent was to choose the printed candidate rather
than a write-in candidate.202 Both the proximity of the mark to the candi-
date’s name and the fact that the voter had clearly voted for another can-
didate in the race, indicated that the voter intended the mark as a vote for
the candidate.203
In that same case but in regards to different ballots, the court de-
clared that it would not count a vote if multiple interpretations were
equally reasonable.204 The court made this declaration in reference to two
ballots from the same race in which two voters had scribbled over votes.205
In one instance, two ovals were darkened but one of the ovals also had
scribble marks over it.206 The court believed that it was most reasonable
to interpret the scribbles as a revocation of the voter’s choice rather than
192. See generally In re Primary Election Ballot Disputes 2004, 2004 ME 99, 857
A.2d 494 (reversing the outcome of two elections).
193. Id. ¶ 22, 857 A.2d at 501.
194. Id. ¶ 21, 857 A.2d at 501.
195. Id. ¶ 22, 857 A.2d at 501.
196. Id. ¶ 23, 857 A.2d at 502.
197. Id. ¶ 24, 857 A.2d at 502.
198. Id. ¶ 25, 857 A.2d at 502.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. ¶ 26, 857 A.2d at 502. The court reasoned the voter did not see the indica-
tor for boxes for that candidate and instead chose the closest indicator box he could
find; the voter used the arrow to clarify the choice. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. ¶ 29, 857 A.2d at 503.
205. Id. ¶ 27, 857 A.2d at 502–503.
206. Id.
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an attempt to emphasize the voter’s choice.207 In fact, the voters had scrib-
bled over a separate race as a revocation.208 Thus the court reasoned that
the oval that was cleanly darkened was the voter’s intent while the oval
scribbled over was not.209 The court used similar reasoning with the fourth
ballot and found that scribbles over an X were a clear attempt to revoke
the vote cast.210
Despite possible ballot ambiguities, the Maine Supreme Court de-
cided that it would allow a ballot to be counted if the ballot had multiple
markings because of an attempt to revoke the extraneous mark or
marks.211 After the ballots were counted, a Maine House District race was
two votes apart and there were three votes that were contested.212 For two
of those ballots, there was a question of whether there was an overvote.213
The court, interpreting the statute as placing ultimate significance on the
indicator box as the space for expressing voter choice, found that marking
an indicator box is the ultimate act of voting.214 Therefore, when a voter
marks more boxes than allowed and makes no attempt to revoke with
extraneous marks, the vote is invalid.215 However, when it is unclear
whether there is an overvote and two boxes or ovals are marked differ-
ently, the court looks at the rest of the ballot.216
In one instance of different marks, a single dot appeared in one oval
while the other oval was fully darkened by the voter.217 The Maine Su-
preme Court looked at the rest of the ballot and determined that the
voter demonstrated his intent to comply with the instructions on the bal-
lot and fully darkened other ovals when voting.218 The court found that
the dot in the oval could not be reasonably interpreted as anything other
than a stray mark and could therefore count the vote by determining the
voter’s intent.219
Maine’s statute requires that the courts determine voter intent only
when the number of valid challenged ballots affects the outcome of the
207. Id. ¶ 29, 857 A.2d at 503.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. ¶ 30, 857 A.2d at 503.
211. See id.
212. Id. ¶ 31, 857 A.2d at 503.
213. Id. ¶¶ 32–35, 857 A.2d at 503–504.
214. Id. ¶ 33, 857 A.2d at 504.
215. Id. ¶ 34, 857 A.2d at 504.
216. Id. ¶ 35, 857 A.2d at 504.
217. Id. ¶ 36, 857 A.2d at 504.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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election.220 If that is the case, the court will not count a vote if multiple
interpretations are equally reasonable.221 Thus, the Maine courts put a
high value on avoiding voter disenfranchisement by restricting judicial re-
view to only instances where one or a few voters’ intent will decide an
election.
B. Wisconsin
Wisconsin’s voter intent statute222 has been interpreted similar to
Maine’s in that although the legislature has defined several marks that
can be used to signify the voter’s intent, the courts do not see the list as
exhaustive.223 For the vote to be valid, there must be a mark on the ballot
and the mark must show the voter’s intent to qualify as a valid vote.224
However, in Wisconsin, courts do not want to deprive voters of the op-
portunity to have their votes counted.225 So Wisconsin voting statutes are
construed to give effect to the intent of the voter notwithstanding a fail-
ure to comply with provisions governing elections.226 Therefore, a ballot
legally cast by a voter cannot be rejected if it expresses the will of the
voter.227
For example, one voter in a school district referendum had at-
tempted to erase a slash through the “no” vote.228 The trial court deferred
to the board’s finding of an inability to determine the voter’s intent.229
However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a mark
that might be a partially erased vote is still a mark when there is no other
vote cast on that ballot issue.230 The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed
the finding that the mark was not intended to invalidate a vote231 and was
made in a qualified place on the ballot by a mark enumerated in the stat-
ute.232 Wisconsin’s statute, although in appearance restrictive, is distin-
220. Id. ¶ 20, 857 A.2d at 501.
221. Id. ¶ 29, 857 A.2d at 503.
222. WIS. STAT ANN. §7.50 (West 2011).
223. See Roth v. LaFarge Sch. Dist. Bd. of Canvassers, 2002 WI App 309, ¶ 9, 259
Wis. 2d 349, 354–55, 655 N.W.2d 471, 473.
224. Roth v. LaFarge Sch. Dist. Bd. of Canvassers, 2004 WI App 6, ¶ 17, 268 Wis.
2d 335, 345, 677 N.W.2d 599, 604.
225. Id. ¶ 19, 677 N.W.2d at 605.
226. Id. ¶ 22, 677 N.W.2d at 606.
227. Id. ¶ 23, 677 N.W.2d at 606.
228. Id. ¶ 16, 677 N.W.2d at 604.
229. Id. ¶ 4, 677 N.W.2d at 601.
230. Id. ¶ 9, 677 N.W.2d at 603.
231. Id. ¶ 29, 677 N.W.2d at 607.
232. Id. ¶ 27, 677 N.W.2d at 607. The New Mexico Supreme Court rejects Wiscon-
sin’s approach because uniformity similar to Wisconsin would disregard the discretion
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guishable from a statute such as Maine’s statute. Wisconsin courts have
instead decided to put more emphasis on protecting voter disenfranchise-
ment. Instead of restricting judicial review as done by Maine, Wisconsin
courts want to find a voter’s intent.
C. New York
New York has seen several cases in the last few years that have in-
terpreted the state’s voter intent statute as focusing on the ballot instruc-
tions.233 For example, some of the caselaw has invalidated votes when the
voter failed to provide the proper information on a ballot,234 while other
votes were invalidated when the voters did not reside in the county in
which they voted.235 New York has also decided whether to invalidate a
voter’s intent when a ballot has an unintentional stray mark,236 food
stains,237 overvotes,238 marks with blue ink,239 marks in the proper place
but of a type not identified in the statute,240 and intentional marks not in
the proper place.241
In New York, overvotes, which are those votes where it is impossi-
ble to determine voter intent, are consistently found to invalidate one
that local officials need in order to “guard against [voter] disenfranchisement.” State
ex rel. League of Women Voters v. Herrera, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 19, 203 P.3d 94, 98.
“An overly mechanical or formulaic approach might lead to unnecessary disen-
franchisement of voters who mark their ballot in ways not accounted for in official
guidelines, but which nonetheless, to the human eye, would appear as clear expres-
sions of voter intent.” Id. ¶ 21, 203 P.3d at 99.
233. See, e.g., Carney v. Davignon, 735 N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
(invalidating ballots because they did not have the markings required by election
law); see also N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 9-112(1) (McKinney 2009) (“The whole ballot is
void if the voter (a) does any act extrinsic to the ballot such as enclosing any paper or
other article in the folded ballot or (b) defaces or tears the ballot . . . (d) makes any
mark thereon other than a cross X mark or a check V mark in a voting square, or
filling in the voting square, or punching a hole in the voting square of a ballot in-
tended to be counted by machine or (e) writes, other than in the space provided, a
name for the purpose of voting . . . .”).
234. See Carney, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
235. See Stewart v. Chautauqua Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 894 N.Y.S.2d 249, 252-53
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
236. See Carney, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
237. See Brilliant v. Gamache, 808 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
238. See Carney, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
239. Mondello v. Nassau Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 772 N.Y.S.2d 693, 697 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004). The court found that because the election law did not specify the type of
pen that may be used, the use of a blue pen did not invalidate the voter’s intent. Id.
240. See id.
241. See Alessio v. Carey, 854 N.Y.S.2d 830, 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008).
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contest but not the rest of the ballot.242 Marks that traverse certain boxes
that contain names, ovals, party symbols, and affiliations are included as
overvotes.243 New York, however, differentiates among the types of
marks, determining whether they are intentional or unintentional and
whether those specific marks invalidate a ballot or a race. For example,
unintentional stray marks invalidate a ballot when marks on the ballot
can identify the voter no matter the number or placement of the marks,244
and indeed any stray marks outside the designated “voting squares” in-
validate not only the race, but also the entire ballot.245 Similarly, when
one voter made a mark in the box labeled “Democratic,” which appears
outside the voting squares, the mark invalidated the entire ballot.246 The
court noted that lthough voting squares include the space for a voter to
mark the vote, the definition of a voting square is not limited to the box
next to the candidate’s name.247 So if a mark is placed in a larger square
containing a candidate’s name, it may invalidate the race but not necessa-
rily the entire ballot.248
New York law on inadvertent marks appears inconsistent. On an
absentee ballot, the New York Appeals Court found that a mark on a
ballot does not render the ballot void in whole or in part when the court
determines that the mark appears to be inadvertent.249 However, allowing
inadvertent marks is contrary to other holdings that have invalidated en-
tire ballots because of inadvertent marks.250 New York courts have ad-
dressed the discrepancy by differentiating marks that have the potential
to identify an individual’s ballot will invalidate the ballot while others
have not.251 These other marks include inadvertent underlining or a ballot
242. See Carney, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
243. Alessio, 854 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
244. See id. (finding an intentional mark on a ballot’s lower left-hand margin
outside the voting square invalidated the entire ballot); Carney, 735 N.Y.S.2d at 265
(finding marks made at the top of eight of the nine voting columns on a ballot invali-
dated the entire ballot because the marks could have identified the voter). Similarly, a
New York court has found that pen marks underlining the names of candidates to be
inadvertent and allowed those ballots to be counted as long as those marks do not
identify the voter. See In re Brilliant, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
245. See Boudreau v. Catanise, 737 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
246. See In re Brilliant v. Gamache, 808 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
247. Mondello v. Nassau Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 772 N.Y.S.2d 693, 698 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004).
248. See id.
249. See Mondello, 772 N.Y.S.2d at 698–699.
250. See, e.g., Boudreau v. Catanise, 737 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (N.Y App. Div. 2002);
Carney v. Davignon, 735 N.Y.S.2d 263, 265 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
251. See In re Brilliant, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 730.
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that has an obvious food stain.252 Therefore, the inconsistency in New
York’s law on inadvertent marks can be explained by the state’s policy to
ensure that the voter stays anonymous.
The New York voter intent statute is specific in that unless the vot-
ing square is filled in, or there is a cross or a check mark in the voting
square, the whole ballot is void.253 For example, in one particular case an
appellate judge overruled a lower court judge and determined that an
indistinguishable scribble satisfies the requirements of the statute and
does not render the ballot void in whole or in part.254 Therefore, when a
voter in New York places a mark other than a cross or a check in a voting
square it will not invalidate the ballot simply because it is not one of the
enumerated marks.255 Similarly, when a voting square contained a cross
with multiple lines, which the court believes indicated an attempt to oblit-
erate the vote, those lines did not invalidate the ballot.256 As such, the
courts have created case law that interprets New York’s statute to require
a level of specificity not found in either Maine or Wisconsin’s statutes. So
rather than focusing on the intent of the voter, New York courts are more
concerned with other issues including the anonymity of the voter as well
as the instructions on the ballot.
D. Analysis of New Mexico’s Statute
Like the Main Supreme Court, the New Mexico Supreme Court re-
quires voter intent to be clear. New Mexico, though, rejects an approach
similar to Wisconsin’s because such uniformity would disregard the dis-
cretion that local officials need in order to “guard against voter
disenfranchisement.”257
Furthermore, although the New Mexico statute is not as specific as
New York’s statute, the New Mexico Supreme Court still expects the Sec-
retary of State to enforce the statute and regulations in such a way as to
achieve uniformity in interpreting ballots. In New Mexico, subsection
252. Id.
253. See N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 9-112(1) (McKinney 2009) (“The whole ballot is
void if the voter . . . (d) makes any mark thereon other than a cross X mark or a
check V mark in a voting square, or filling in the voting square, or punching a hole in
the voting square of a ballot intended to be counted by machine . . . .”).
254. Mondello, 772 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. State ex rel. League of Women Voters v. Herrera, 2009-NMSC-003, ¶ 8, 203
P.3d 94, 96; see also id. ¶ 21, 203 P.3d 99 (“An overly mechanical or formulaic ap-
proach might lead to unnecessary disenfranchisement of voters who mark their ballot
in ways not accounted for in official guidelines, but which nonetheless, to the human
eye, would appear as clear expressions of voter intent.”).
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(B)(4) “provides sufficient assurances that county clerks in various parts
of the state will interpret voter’s intent in a uniform and nondiscrimina-
tory fashion” in order to meet the requirements of HAVA.258
There are marked differences in the ways various state courts have
interpreted their state statutes to balance uniformity and voter disen-
franchisement, and yet there has not been any involvement by the U.S.
Supreme Court to assess the validity of any of these statutes or their in-
terpretations. Because of the latitude allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court
and Congress, it cannot be said that the New Mexico statute is invalid on
the grounds that other state statutes vary by having more or less uniform-
ity. With laws that focus more on uniformity than New Mexico, like Wis-
consin and New York, and laws that focus more on voter
disenfranchisement, like Maine, it is not possible to declare that New
Mexico’s balance of uniformity and voter disenfranchisement violates
HAVA or the principals set out in Bush v. Gore.
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court based the validity of New Mex-
ico’s voter intent statute in part on the statute’s similarity to other state
statutes. However, those state’s statutes, such as Missouri, as well as the
caselaw interpreting those statutes, like that found in Montana, do not
support that contention. This does not mean that New Mexico’s statute is
invalid. Other statutes and caselaw associated with those statutes in states
like New York and Wisconsin, which not cited by the New Mexico Su-
preme Court, are varied in their balance of uniformity and disen-
franchisement. Each of those statutes is still valid so it follows that so is
New Mexico’s statute. State statutes and the state court opinions inter-
preting those statutes, although not necessarily helpful to the New Mex-
ico Supreme Court, have all articulated several different ways of
balancing uniformity with the process of discerning voter intent.
Indeed, at some point in the future, the U.S. Supreme Court may
still be called on to draw a more definitive line for state courts to follow.
This will probably be done in an equal protection challenge that reviews
what has worked and what has not worked for the lower courts.259 For
now, however, the state laboratories are continuing to answer questions
about balancing uniformity with voter intent. As they do, states continue
to diverge in their approaches. But in some cases, those approaches lead
258. Id. ¶ 27, 203 P.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
259. HASEN, supra note 45, at 66. R
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to similar results.260 With the intentional lack of assistance from Congress
and the U.S. Supreme Court, New Mexico should continue to analyze its
election administration statutes, specifically those regarding voter intent,
to provide the U.S. Supreme Court with further ideas as to what works
and what does not so they can make an informed decision as to whether
revisit their holding in Bush v. Gore.
260. Compare Big Spring v. Jore, 2005-MT-64, 109 P.3d 219, with League of Wo-
men Voters, 2009-NMSC-003, 203 P.3d 94 (using different approaches, both courts
found that the voter’s intent was clear and counted the ballots).
